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The attraction of new industry is an ongoing impacts. Thus, the economic-demographic concern for most local officials. Generally, local impact must be allocated to the local area of officials are aware of the private sector beneinterest to decision makers. fits of new jobs and income. Attention is beginSecond, fiscal impact models have become ning to be paid to secondary private sector immore sophisticated in the specification of the pacts such as the effect of new industry on marginal costs of public service delivery. Use local wage rates and the problems associated of per capita local expenditures is being rewith in-migration of labor to fill new jobs.
placed by engineering-economic studies and Borts and Stein (Chapter 9) give a theoretical behavioral models that measure marginal discussion of these issues.
expenditures. (See Borcherding and Deacon for In addition researchers and policy makers a behavioral model and Chalmers and Anderare interested in the development of models son for examples of engineering-economic that estimate the impact of new industry on analysis.) local government expenditures and revenues.
However, the fiscal impact models do not apMany computerized versions of local fiscal pear to have the same emphasis on refinement impact models are reviewed in a recently pubof the tax revenue side of the fiscal impact lished text (Burchell and Listokin, .
question. For property taxes, a common proThe popularity of these models is understandcedure is to make a judgment (usually on curable because of the potential benefits to be derent per capita values) of the change in the rived from accurate forecasts of local fiscal imvalue of the local property tax base. Per capita pact. For example, a community can determine values of the current property tax base are the magnitude of a tax incentive it can offer to used with estimates of the additional populaindustry and still maintain a positive fiscal tion associated with the new industry to estiimpact for local government. Zoning laws can mate the secondary additions to the local be written to encourage land use patterns that property tax base.' The primary addition to will be efficient from the public sector's the local property tax base is determined from perspective if the public expenditures and the firm's estimate of the capital value of the public revenues associated with alternative new plant or equipment. Finally, local assessland use patterns can be predicted. Finally, ment ratios and millage rates are applied to the local areas may be able to demonstrate to state additional property tax base for the estimation government that a large-scale industrial proof property tax revenues associated with the ject will benefit the fiscal position of the state new industry (Burchell and Listokin, pp. 179-but be a burden to the local fiscal balance. 81). The development of fiscal impact models Two sets of problems are involved in this per during the past 15 years since the work of Lowcapita approach. One set of problems arise enstein and Hirsch has followed two basic from the use of current average tax base eflines. First, the economic models used have fects when marginal or "new" average effects continued to range from simple economic base would be more appropriate. The second set of to primary input-output models. However, the problems stem from the use of the current tax demographic sector is clearly recognized in the rate. more recent models (see Clayton; Hertsgaard The secondary tax base effects of new inet al.). These models are becoming more comdustry depend on a variety of factors, some of plex as they integrate economic, demographic, which are wage levels paid by the new industry, and residential location components. The need local versus inmigrant labor requirements, and for this additional complexity is apparent from interindustry effects. Generally, one would exa policy maker's perspective. A municipal or pect high wage rates and low import requirecounty decision maker is concerned with the ments to result in large secondary tax base effiscal impact of new industry on his or her comfects. In addition, if new industry induced inmunity, not the regional (multicounty) migration rather than utilizing available labor, 'Secondary additions to the property tax base include residential and commercial property, automobiles, farm land, and other components of the property tax base aside from the value of the new plant itself. the secondary tax base effects would be large. governmental transfers, and local borrowing Conversely, new industry that pays low wages, as shown in equation 2. has large import requirements, and uses local labor would have relatively low secondary tax (2) E + C = G + T + BR + GRS + SSR base effects.
These generalizations about secondary tax where base effects require conceptual and expirical testing. However, in this article we address the G = grants-in-aid set of problems related to use of the current T = local taxes tax rate and therefore proceed as though BR = local borrowing for capital improvesecondary additions to the property tax base ment can be accurately estimated. Accordingly, the GRS = federal general revenue sharing funds new industry impact on the property tax base SSR = state revenue shared with local govis the sum of the value of the plant and equipernment ment of the new firm (primary addition) and the secondary addition resulting from inThe Gramlich approach treats the local govcreased employment and income in the region. ernment budget process as one whereby local If one now proceeds to estimate new properpreferences are expressed for public service ty tax revenue with current assessment and (via E and C) and for after tax income (Y-T). millage rates, several problems will be enIn addition, the budget constraint (equation 2) countered. When the local property tax base requires that local revenues equal local exgrows, local government may respond by penditure. By using the standard Lagrangian lowering tax rates to generate the desired level maximization formulation and selecting a of tax revenues (Penniman) . The desired level utility function that corresponds to the Gramof tax revenues is the critical variable in the lich model, one can form equation 3. subsequent decision about the local tax rate. Inman (1979, pp. 274-5) notes two major adThe tax revenue decision depends on the devantages of this approach in comparison with sired mix between public and private goods as ad hoc approaches. "First, the potential role of perceived by local governmental units. ConseFederal and Fiscal policy variables can be quently, use of current tax rates to estimate clearly stipulated and specific hypotheses as to property tax revenue from new industry overtheir effects on local choices can be tested. simplifies the tax estimation problem.
Second, because of legal requirements for a balThe purpose of this article is to develop an anced budget, the between service effects of alternative framework for analyzing the service-specific policies can be explicitly inproperty tax impact of new industry.
corporated into the analysis through the models imposed budget constraint." THE MODEL
The following constrained utility function can be formed with the usual public and The model treats tax-expenditure behavior private good arguments (Gramlich, p. 164) . of the local public sector as a problem of maximizing community welfare subject to a budget (3) U = a, (E-aG-fSSR-(1-f)SSR-GRS)-a2 constraint (Gramlich) . The objective in formu-2 lating the model is to develop an equation for (E-aG-PSSR-(1-fl)SSR-GRS) 2 + a.aGestimating the impact of new industry on local property tax rates. a4 a 2 G 2 + aPSSR -a6 3 2 SSR 2 + We start by defining the community welfare 2 2 function in equation 1. a 7 (1-P)SSR -a8 (1-p) 2 SSR 2 + agGRS - E is total local expenditures. Thus icy variables, E, T, and BR. the difference is financed by local sources of revenue. a 3 , a -reflect the influence of matched (4) aU/aE = a+a 2 (E-aG -PSSRgrants-in-aid on the community (1-P)SSR-GRS) + A = 0 welfare where a is the legal matching ratio of local and federal funds. can be estimated by using ordinary areas "suffer increasing marginal least squares although structural equation 6 is disutility, the higher borrowing is unidentified. If our only objective is to forecast relative to their current construction local property taxes, we need not be concerned (capital) outlays. The planning horiwith estimating these structural parameters. zon for construction periods is However, our purpose is to evaluate the impact longer than one period and they can of new industry on local property taxes. Acbe considered as predetermined for cordingly, we consider that equation 7 indithe moment" (Gramlich, p. 164) .
cates the relevant explanatory variables for A is the Langrangian multiplier.
property tax variation and now turn our atThere is ample reason to believe that these tention to local property tax variation in parameters will differ in value. First, local deciresponse to new industry. sion makers and their constituents are likely to place higher values on the a 1 parameter than the a 3 , a 5 , a 7 , or a 9 parameters because a more Property Tax Identity immediate sacrifice is apparent in raising ownsource revenues than in financing local exLocal property taxes can be defined to equal penditures either partially with other funds the product of the market value of the property (i.e., matching grant) or totally with other (B), the assessment ratio (A), and the millage funds (GRS or SSR). 3 rate (M). The effective tax rate = AM = RATE. Second, the all and a 1 2 parameters are expected to be different from the others because (9) T = A xB xM they reflect the influence of private expenditures rather than public expenditures on comThe A and M variables are the policy tools munity welfare. Finally, a13 is likely to differ available to local decision makers in their defrom the others in that it reflects both past and termination of tax rates. These local policy current decisions to provide public capital for variables are influenced by changes in Y, GRS, current and future residents of the community.
SSR, and G as suggested by equation 7. GRS, If the levels of C, G, Y, SSR, and GRS are SSR, and G tend to serve as substitutes for A given to the local community, the utility probor M (Penniman) . 4 Higher per capita income inlem reduces to the maximization of the condicates an increase in demand for public goods strained function with respect to the local poland thus in the property tax levies required to "Of course, rational individuals are aware that GRS, GRANTS, and SSR are paid partially from their own state and federal taxes. However, the "partial" nature of these revenue sources for expenditures implies less sacrifice than "own taxes." 'Wilde (p. 87) describes a wide range of potential expenditure responses by local governments to intergovernmental transfers depending on the type of grant and type of model used to assess the impact of the grant.
1
-q.0 provide them. In addition to the behavorial intute for local tax rate increases because the fluences on the tax rate, the tax identity denegative coefficients of the GRANTS and SSR fines an inverse relationship between the tax variables are statistically significant by the tbase and rate. The variables that influence the test criterion. The positive and significant local tax rate are summarized in equation 10.
GRS coefficient appears counterintuitive if GRS funds are a substitute for local tax rate (10) RATE = F(G, GRS, SSR, B, Y) increases. There are several possible explanations for this positive coefficient. First, GRS A property tax base equation could also be funds may be viewed as outside funds that are developed. However, our concern is to test for used for local public goods that would not variations in property tax rates in response to otherwise be provided. This would imply a changes in the exogenous variables in equation neutral relationship between the local tax rate 10 while holding the tax base constant.
and GRS transfers. However, because the GRS A criticism of many local government fiallocation formula is to some extent dependent nance studies is the use of aggregated data of on local tax efforts, this coefficient may indistates and various local governmental units cate that local officials are aware of the incen- (Inman, p. 273) . We avoid this problem by contive to increase the local tax effort in order to sidering only county governments in South obtain increases in GRS allocations. Second, Carolina. However, even at this level there are there may be a statistical simultaneity bias besome significant data problems. Chief among cause of the relative tax effort factor in the them in our study is the use of grant outlays GRS allocation formula for county governdata by county. The results of equation 15 indicate GRS simullevels result in higher tax rates. The relationtaneity bias does exist and it alters individual ship appears to be one of approximate unitary parameter estimates. At the 10 percent level of income elasticity. Alternatively, if the tax significance, neither GRS nor GRANTS has a base, personal income, and other intergovernnonzero coefficient. 7 However, SSR, Y, and per mental transfers are held constant, the local capita base enter the equation with the expectproperty tax rate is not significantly affected ed signs and are statistically significant.
by GRS or GRANT revenues but is reduced by The following conclusion can be drawn from increases in SSR revenues. the empirical results. South Carolina local govFinally, the relationship between new inernment property tax rates are influenced by dustry and new local property tax revenues invariations in the tax base, intergovernmental volves interdependencies between tax base, transfers, and the demand for government serintergovernmental transfers, and tax rates. vices as expressed by county personal income.
Fiscal impact analysts who predict the change If the tax base and intergovernmental transin property tax revenues from new industry fers are held constant, higher personal income need to capture these interdependencies in their modeling efforts.
